Artemis Moon Plan Under Fire as China's Steady Strategy Advances

The Artemis Program Faces Challenges in the Race to the Moon

The United States is facing a growing concern that it may lose the race to return to the Moon due to its own engineering and programmatic decisions. This issue was highlighted during a recent House subcommittee hearing, where lawmakers and space experts discussed the increasing risk that China could land astronauts on the lunar surface before NASA’s Artemis program achieves its first crewed landing.

At the center of this discussion was former NASA Administrator Mike Griffin, who provided a direct assessment of the current structure of the Artemis program. The plan relies on a Human Landing System based on SpaceX’s Starship, which needs to be refueled in low Earth orbit before heading to the Moon. This refueling process would require an uncertain number of Starship tanker launches—up to 12 according to one internal estimate—and depends on cryogenic propellant transfer, a capability that has never been tested in space. Griffin warned that the extended time required for multiple refueling flights would likely cause boil-off of the liquid oxygen and methane propellants, making the mission unfeasible. “An architecture which requires a high number of refueling flights in low-Earth orbit… is very unlikely to work,” he told lawmakers.

The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel has also raised concerns about the cryogenic transfer-capable version of Starship, noting that it is behind schedule and that the technology remains one of the highest risks for Artemis 3. Panelist Paul Hill emphasized that while the rapid cadence of SpaceX’s Falcon 9 has improved reliability, competing priorities between Starship’s commercial applications and its lunar variant could delay the crewed landing by years beyond the 2027 target.

In contrast, China’s systematic progress in its lunar program stands out. The Chang’e missions have consistently met their milestones: Chang’e 4 landed on the far side, and Chang’e 5 returned samples. A 2026 South Pole landing is next, followed by an International Lunar Research Station by 2028, and a crewed mission targeted for 2030. According to Dean Cheng of the Potomac Institute, China's centralized governance provides "programmatic stability, budgetary stability, staff stability" over decades, offering a structural advantage over NASA’s shifting priorities across administrations.

Beyond architectural differences, witnesses and lawmakers pointed to deeper systemic issues with contracting practices. For more than a decade, the NASA Orion spacecraft, the SLS, and related ground systems have faced multi-year delays and billions in overruns under cost-plus contracts. These deals reimburse contractors for all allowable expenses plus profit, giving them little incentive to control costs or meet schedules. “If they fail to deliver on time and on budget… there need to be consequences,” Cheng said, advocating for a shift toward competitive, fixed-price models that have worked well on programs including Commercial Crew and CLPS.

CLPS itself was cited as a model for accelerating lunar capabilities through private-sector competition. The program has issued firm fixed-price contracts to 14 U.S. companies for robotic lunar deliveries, encouraging rapid iteration and cost discipline. Companies like Intuitive Machines and ispace are now transitioning from demonstration to regular flight cadence, with missions addressing technically demanding targets such as the Moon’s far side, which requires deployment of dedicated relay satellites for communications and navigating the rugged, shadowed terrain of the South Pole.

These areas are of high strategic interest for their potential water ice deposits, which could be converted into propellant or life-support resources. However, even CLPS demonstrates the complexity of lunar operations. Precision landing in polar regions requires threading narrow illuminated plateaus between deep craters, while thermal extremes and lengthy periods of darkness stress power and thermal control systems. Automated landing systems must work perfectly, as there is no real-time human intervention like during Apollo.

Commercial partners are also testing infrastructure concepts, such as leaving communications assets in lunar orbit for use by future missions, to avoid "reinventing the wheel" for each landing. The stakes go beyond prestige. Griffin and others underscored that the country which first establishes a sustained lunar presence will enjoy disproportionate influence in shaping norms regarding resource utilization and surface access. If China gets there first, it could leverage that advantage to monopolize strategically valuable sites.

For the U.S., this makes Artemis not just a technical program but a geopolitical instrument—one now under scrutiny for whether its engineering choices, contracting practices, and political stability can deliver before the window closes.